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20 IJ.R.A.N.S. 337].) [6] In view of the circumstances, we
('allnot say that the condition imposed here is unreasonabl('.
Th(' ordcr to show cause is discharged, and the petition is
u('nied.
ShE-nk, J., Bdmonds, .T., Carter, J., Traynor, J.,Scbauer, .J ..
and Spence, J., concurred.
Petitionel"s applil'ation for a l'('hl'arillg" was denied )Ial'('h
6, 1952.
[L. A. Xo. 22125. In Bank. Feb. 15, 19:)2.]

BEATRICE.J. BEXTOX, a minor, ete., et aI., Respondents,
L. D. SLOSS, Appellant.

Y.

[1] Automobiles-Care as to Guests.-While Veb. Code, § 403,
protects the driver and all persons legally liable for his
conduct from liability to guests for ordinary negligence, he
is liable for in.iuriE's to guests caused· by his intoxication 01'
wilful misconduct.
[2] Id.-Persons Liable-Owner-Wilful Misconduct of Driver.Owner of vehicle cannot be held liablE' under Veh. Code.
§ 403, for wilful misconduct of 19-year-old boy in racing a
defective car on the highway against another car, where thcrl'
is no showing that the boy was the owner's agent.
[3] Id.-Persons Liable-Owner-Wilful Misconduct of Driver.Owner of vehicle cannot be held liable for wilful misconduct
of driver under Veh. Code, § 402, imputing to owner of YE'hicle liability for negligent operation, where there is no
principal-agent relationship between owner and driver.
[4] Id.-Persons Liable-Owner-Construction of Statute.-Phrase
"person legally liable" in Veh. Code, § 403, barring action!'
against the "drh'er" of a vehicle or against "any other person
legally liable for the conduct of such driver" is intended to ':
cO\"l'r cases in which the owner is vicariously liable for the
driver's conduct because of the rl'lationship of the partil'!',

[lJ Liability of owner or operator for injury to guest, note!;,
20 A.L.R. 1014; 26 A.L.R. 1425; 40 A.L.R. 138; 47 A.L.R. 327; 51
A.L.R. 581; 61 A.L.R. 1252; 65 A.L.R. 952. See, also, Cal.Jur.,
lO-Yr.Supp., Automobiles, § 358; Am.Jur., Automobiles, § 237.
iriCK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 123(1); [2,3J Automobiles, §167(1l); [4-6] Automobiles, §167(2); [7,8,11) Automobiles, § 63n; (9) Automobiles, § 220; [10,12J Automobiles,
§ 167(8).
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as principal-agent, or because of imputed negligence. under
Veh. Code, § 402.
ld;-Persons Liable-Owner-Construction of Statute.-Veh.
Code, § 403, does 1I0t limit the common-law liability of the
owner' of a vehicle for his own negligence as owner.
ld.-Persons Liable-Owner-Construction of Statute.-Under
Veh. Code, § 403, the only pel'Sons absolved from liability to
guests for ordinary negligence are the driver and those legally
responsible for his acts, and where the owner is not the
driver the word "driver," as used in such code provision,
will not be construed to include "owner" so as to absolve .
him from liability for failure to maintain his vehicle in proper
mechanical condition.
ld.-Sales and Transfers-Liability for Defects.-Although a
used car dealer does not insure the safety of a car he sells !
and is under no duty to disassemble the car to examine its i
parts, he must make a reasonable inspection for defects which
would make the car a menace on the highways.
ld.-Sales and Transfers-Liability for Defects.-In action
for injuries sustained by guests of minor while riding in
automobile which' he intended to purchase from defendant
used car dealer, it is reasonable to conclude that a reasonable
inspection would have disclosed defective brakes in such car '
where, although defendant testified that he had given the
car a road test about five days before the proposed sale and
that the brakes had then operated satisfactorily, there is no
evidence that he made any test to determine whether the
brakes met the standards prescribed by Veh. Code, § 670,
where his mechanics did not inspect or do any work on the
brakes, and where the failure of the brakes shortly after
delivery of the car to the minor indicates that the defect was
present and discernible at the time of the proposed sale.
ld.-Evidence-Defective Brakes.-In action for injuries sustained by guests of minor while riding in automobile which
he intended to purchase from defendant used car dealer, it
is reasonable to conclude that defendant's negligence in failing to make a reasonable inspection of the vehicle for defects
was a contributing cause of plaintiffs' injuries, and that because of defective brakes the minor could not avoid colliding
with a telephone pole when his car skidded across the highway,
where the minor's testimony, corroborated by that of his
guests and by. skid marks on the pavement, established that
a rear wheel of the car locked when he attempted to apply
the brakes, and one of the guests testified that the ear swung

[7] Liability of seller of defective or unsafe automobile for
injury or damage caused thereby, notes, 99 A.L.R. 240; 122 A.L.B.
997. See, also, Am.Jur., Automobiles, § 349.
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to the right when the minor applied the brakes, although he
kept turning the steering wheel to the left.
[10] ld.-Persons Liable-Used Car Dealer.-Negligent conduct
of minor in driving automobile which he intended to purchase
from a used car dealer does not relieve such dealer from
liability for injuries resulting from his negligence in selling
such automobile equipped with defective brakes, for the likelihood of negligent operation of the vehicle is a hazard which
the dealer can reasonably foresee.
[11] ld.-Sales and Transfers-Liability for Defects.-Possibility
of a driver's negligently placing himself in a position from
which he cannot extricate himself without adequate brakes
imposes on a used car dealer a duty to test and adjust the
brakes of the car, and thus prevent it from endangering the
lives of occupants, pedestrians and other users of the highway; and this duty extends not only to a prospective buyer,
but also to third persons who can reasonably be expected to
be in the vicinity of the possible use of the automobile.
[12] ld.-Persons Liable-Used Car Dealer.-Where used car
dealer gaye minor permission to take an automobile to his
home to induce his father to sign a contract to purchase the
car, such dealer could reasonably expect that the minor would
not only test performance of the car, but also drive it pending
negotiation of the contract; and where the father refused
to sign the contract, the dealer did not as requested by the
father CODle for the car, and the minor thereafter endeavored to
return the car, but the dealer's used car lot was closed, it
cannot be said that the minor's operation of the car on that
day was a risk beyond that created when the dealer allowed
him to take the car from the lot.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County. Arthur L. Mundo, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained in an
automobile accident. Judgrqent for plaintiffs affirmed.
McInnis & Hamilton and John W. McInnis for Appellant.
Johnson & Johnson and Harry Ashfield for Respondents.
Belli, Ashe & Pinney, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-On Friday, May 23, 1947, defendant Jay
Fetters, a 19-year-old boy, selected at defendant Sloss' used
car lot a 1935 Chevrolet that Sloss had purchased five days
earlier. Sloss did not ask Jay his age or whether he had a
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driver's license. Jay paid $75 of the $100 down payment,
and Sloss allowed him to take the car home. On Saturday
afternoon, Jay returned with the car and the $25 balance of
the down payment. While filling out the sales contract, Sloss
discovered that Jay was a minor and refused to complete the
contract unless Jay's father signed it. Jay left the lot about
5 o'clock with the car and a contract form for his father to
sign. The father refused to sign. He testified that "when I
looked at the car and seen it was nothing but a wreck I called
up Sloss and told him to come and get the car j that the kid
had no business with it; that he had no driver's license and no
experience, and that it was nothing but 8 wreck, but he
wouldn't pick it up." The father then told Jay to return
the car. Jay drove it to the lot Saturday night and again
Sunday morning, but Sloss. was not there at either time.
After leaving the car lot on Sunday morning, Jay met two
minor girl friends, Beatrice Benton and Marlie Alden, plaintiffs in this action, and a boy friend (Richard Kasitz, and
took them for a rid~ in the country. They were accpmpanied
by another car driven by Elden Earnest. The two drivers
were racing and alternately passing each other on a two-lane
highway at about 45 miles per hour. As Jay was passing
Elden's car, another car suddenly emerged from a dip in the
road. To avoid a head-on collision, Jay swerved to the right,
and passed in front of Elden's car and behind a car immediately ahead of Elden travelling in the same direction. Since
the Chevrolet did not have a horn, Jay could not warn Elden
to pull over or slow down. To avoid hitting the car in front
of Elden, Jay applied his brakes. The right rear wheel
locked and the left wheel brakes failed to operate. His car
skidded across the highway, leaving black skid marks on the
right side only. Jay attempted to drive onto the shoulder
of the highway, but the car slid into a telephone pole by the
highway. Plaintiffs were injured by the collision of the car
with the telephone pole.
Plaintiffs filed this action against Sloss, Jay, and Jay's
father. The case was tried without a jury, and each plaintiff
recovered judgment against Jay and Sloss. Judgment was
returned in favor of Jay's father. Defendant Sloss alone
has appealed.
[1] Sloss first contends that he is absolved from liability
under section 403 of the Vehicle Code.· This statute protects
·"No person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle upon a
without givin~ compensation for such ride, nor any other

hi~hway

)
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the driver and all pel'SOIlS legally liable for his conduct from
liability to guests for ordinary negligence. 'fhe driver is
liable, however, for injuries to his guests caused by his intoxication or wilful misconduct. [2] There is no evidence of intoxication in the present case, but the trial court found that
Jay was guiltr of wilful misconduct in operating a defective
car, operating it without experience, and racing it on the
highway against another car. Sloss, however, cannot be held i
under section 403 for Jay's wilful misconduct, since there was
no showing that Jay was Sloss' agent. (Stober v. Halsey,
88 Cal.App.2d 660, 665 [199 P.2d 318).) [3] For the same
reason Sloss cannot be held under Vehicle Code, section 402,
imputing to the owner of a vehicle liability for negligent operation, for, in the absence of a principal-agent relationship between the owner and the driver, the owner is not liable for
the driver's wilful misconduct. (Weber v. Pinyan, 9 Cal.2d
226,238 [70 P.2d 183, 112 A.L.R. 407).)
In the present case, however, plaintiffs seek to hold Sloss
for his own negligence, and not as a person legally responsible for the driver's acts under section 403, or as an owner
under section 402. (See Weber v. Pinyan, supra, 9 Cal.2d
226,237.) [4] Section 403 bars actions against the "driver"
of a vehicle or against" any other person legally liable for the !
conduct of such driver." The phrase "person legally liable"
for the driver's conduct is clearly intended to cover cases in
which the owner is vicariously liable for the driver's conduct
because of the relationship of the parties, as principal-agent,
or because of imputed negligence under section 402. (Stober,
v. Halsey, supra; Stephen v. Spaulding, 32 Cal.App.2d 326
[89 P.2d 683].) [5] Section 403 does not limit the commonlaw liability of the owner of a vehicle for his own negligence
as owner.
Sloss contends that since the owner of an automobile would
be guilty of ordinary negligence in failing to make proper
repairs, and would be protected by section 403 if he were
driving the car at the time of the accident (Rhoads v. Studley,
15 Cal.App.2d 726 [59 P.2d 1082] ; Ohlson v. Frazier, 2 Cal.
App.2d 708 [39 P.2d 429]), the purpose of the section would
person, has any right of action for civil damages against the driver
of such vehicle or against any other person legally liable for the eon·
duet of sueh driver on account of personal injury to or the death of
sueh guest during such ride, unless the plaintiff in any such action
establishes that sueh injury or death proximately resulted from the
intoxication or wilful misconduet of said driver."
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be defeated if hEl were held liable for the same act of negligence merely because he was not driving at the time of the
accident.
[6] Section 403, however, nowhere refers to owners of
vehicles. The only persons absolved from liability are the
driver and those legally responsible for his acts. Sloss was
not the driver and the action against him is not based on
any responsibility he might have for the driver's conduct.
Sloss would bring himself within the section by construing
"driver" to include "owner," but the section does not admit
of that construction. Moreover, plaintiffs were Jay's guests,
not Sloss', and are in the same position as anyone else who
was injured because Sloss failed to maintain his vehicle in
proper mechanical condition.
The controlling question, therefore, is whether Sloss was
negligent and if so whether his negligence was a contributing
cause of the accident.
[7] Although a used car dealer does not insure the safety
of a car he sells, and is under no duty to disassemble the car
to examine its parts, he must make a reasonable inspection
for defects that would make the car a menace on the highways.
(Supera v. Moreland Sales Oorp., 13 Cal.App.2d 186, 191
[56 P.2d 595] ; Egan Ohevrolet 00. v. Bruner, 102 F.2d 373,
375; Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick 00., 196 Wis. 196, 210 [218
N.W. 855, 60 A.L.R. 357]; see Prosser, Torts, p. 680; 122
A.L.R. 997i 99 A.L.R. 240.)
Section 660 of the Vehicle Code provides: "No dealer shall
sell a used motor vehicle without first testing and if necessary
adjusting the lights and brakes on such vehicle to conform
with the provisions of this code." The standards for adequate
brakes are set forth in section 670 of the Vehicle Code. Thus,
a motor vehicle must be equipped with brakes adequate to
bring it to a complete stop within 188 feet, when it is operated
at a speed of 45 miles per hour on a dry asphalt or concrete
pavement where the grade does not exceed 1 per cent.
[8] Although Sloss testified that he had given the car a road
test about five days before the proposed sale to Jay and
that the brakes had then operated satisfactorily, there is no
evidence that he made any test of the brakes to determine
whether they met the standards prescribed by this section.
Sloss' mechanics did not inspect or do any work on the brakes.
The failure of the brakes shortly after delivery of the car
to Jay indicates that the defect was present and discernible
at the time of the proposed sale. Sloss' testimony at best
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created a conflict in the evidence, which the trial court resolved in plaintiffs' favor. The trial court could reasonably
conclude that a reasonable inspection would have disclosed the
defective bral,es. (Egan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruner, supra.)
[9] We are also of the opinion that the trial court could
reasonably conclude that Sloss' negligence was a contributing
cause of plaintiffs' injuries. Jay's testimony, corroborated
by the testimony of his guests and by the skid marks on the
pavement, established that the right rear wheel of the car
locked when Jay attempted to apply the brakes. At the most
critica1 part of the operation, the brakes locked. Jay described the situation: "Elden put on his brakes and I tried
to get in between them [the two cars], and I hit my brakes
and the back wheel locked and it [Jay's car] fish-tailed, and
I didn't want to hit the fellow in front of me, and so I
went clear over to hit the shoulder and cramped the wheels
and it slid right into the pole." The shoulder had a gravel
surface and once the car skidded off the pavement, Jay was
unable to get it back on the highway. One of Jay's guests,
Richard Kasitz, testified that the car swung to the right
when Jay applied the brakes, although Jay kept turning the
steering wheel to the left.
Jay's negligent driving was unquestionably a cause of
plaintiffs' injuries. Sloss' negligence was also a cause of
those injuries, if it was a substantial factor in bringing
them about. (McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 Ca1.2d 295,
298 [195 P.2d 783] ; Rest., Torts, § 431.) This question of
fact the trial court resolved in plaintiffs' favor. In the light
of the evidence it could reasonably conclude that because of
the defective brakes Jay could not avoid the collision. Since
we canrrotsay that the issue is so clear that reasonable men
cannot differ, the trial court '8' finding must be sustained.
[10] The question remains whether the injury falls within
the limits of Sloss' legal responsibility for the consequences
of his conduct. Sloss could reasonably foresee that the brakes
would be used in emergi'ncy conditions arising under ordinary
highway speeds. (See Nebelung v. Norman, 14 Ca1.2d 647,
652 [96 P.2d 327].) The negligent conduct of Jay did not
relieve Sloss from liability, for the likelihood of negligent
operation of the vehicle was one of the hazards that Sloss
could reasonably foresee. (Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26
Cal.2d 213, 219, 220 [157 P.2d 372, 158 A.L.R. 872] ; McEvoy
v. American Pool Corp., .~1tpra, 32 Ca1.2d 295, 298; Lacy v.
Pacific Gas &. Elec. Co., 220 Cal. 97 [29 P.2d 7811 ; Opple v.

)
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Ray, 208 Ind. 450, 456 [195 N.E. 81J ; see Rest., Torts, § 447.)
[11] The possibility of a driver's negligently placing himself
in a position from which he could not extricate himself without
adequate brakes imposed on Sloss a duty to test and adjust
the brakes of the car, and thus prevent it from endangering
the lives of occupants, pedestrians, and other users of the
highway. (Veh. Code, § 660; Fl·ies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co.,
supra; Fornlan v. Shields, 183 Wash. 333, 341 [48 P.2d 599].)
Sloss' duty extended not only to the prospective buyer,
but to third persons who could reasonably be expected to
be in the vicinity of the probable use of the automobile.
(Flies v. Fox Buick Co., supra (pedestrian); see Prosser,
Torts, p. 680; Rest., Torts, §§ 388, 392.) The injury to Jay's
guests was therefore within the limits of the risk created by
Sloss' negligence.
[12] Sloss contends that Jay was given permission only to
take the automobile to his father's home to induce him to
sign the contract. Therefore, he argues, the use of the car
for a pleasure trip on the following day was without his
implied or express permission. The evidence shows that Sloss
allowed Jay to take the car home on Saturday afternoon
about 5 o'clock, knowing that he was only 19 years old. Sloss
could reasonably expect, and indeed anticipate with a sale
in mind, that Jay would not only test the performance of
the car but drive it for pleasure pending the negotiation of
the contract. Sloss' own absence from the lot precluded Jay's
returning the car. He closed his lot about 7 0 'clock Saturday
night and went to a ball game, although Jay's father had
telephoned earlier and asked Sloss to come for the car. The
lot was likewise closed on Sunday morning. Under these
circumstances, it cannot be said that Jay's operation of the
car on Sunday was a risk beyond that created when Sloss
allowed Jay to take the car from the lot on Saturday afternoon.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-I do not view the evidence as
sufficient to sustain a finding that Sloss was guilty of negligence proximately contributing to the accident; neither do
I find the judgment against Sloss sustainable, upon the record,
on any tenable theory of law. Accordingly, I should reverse
the judgment.

